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THE CONTROVERSY OVER SYSTEMIC RISK
REGULATION
*

Roberta S. Karmel
INTRODUCTION

T

here is widespread support for a systemic risk regulator in the
United States and in Europe. There is, however, less agreement on
which existing or new organization(s) should assume the task of regulating against systemic risk, on the authority such a regulator should have,
or on the work such a regulator should undertake. In general, the debate
about enhanced systemic risk regulation has been about whether central
banks or other regulators should be required to assess systemic risk or
whether such an assessment should be the job of others. The debate includes the issue of whether a systemic risk regulator should also be a
prudential regulator and whether the regulator that assesses systemic risk
should also have the authority to mandate changes in the financial markets or changes to financial institutions when dangers to the markets
emerge. Much of this debate has been in the form of turf warfare between central banks and other regulators, and therefore the discussions
have been less enlightened than one would have hoped for given the
magnitude of the problems uncovered during the financial meltdown of
2008.
In the United States, the primary issue regarding a systemic risk regulator is whether the Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”) should become the
systemic risk regulator or whether such new powers conflict with the
Fed’s role with respect to monetary policy or with the Fed’s prudential
1
regulation of individual bank holding companies. As an alternative or as
an addition to making the Fed a systemic risk regulator, a Council of
Regulators has been proposed as a replacement for the President’s Working Group.2 Similarly, in Europe there has been a debate over whether
* Centennial Professor of Law and Co-Director, Dennis J. Block Center for the
Study of International Business Law, Brooklyn Law School. A summer research grant
from Brooklyn Law School was of assistance in the preparation of this paper. The author
acknowledges the help of Brooklyn Law School student Inna Chumikova in the preparation of this paper. The paper was completed in February 2010.
1. Regulatory Restructuring: Balancing the Independence of the Federal Reserve in
Monetary Policy with Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th
Cong. (2009) (statement of John B. Taylor, Professor of Economics and Senior Fellow of
Hoover Institution, Stanford University).
2. After the stock market crash of 1987, the President appointed a Working Group
on Financial Markets comprised of the Secretary of Treasury, and the Chairmen of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission,

824

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 35:3

the European Central Bank (“ECB”), national central banks, or other
3
regulators should be given systemic risk regulatory responsibilities. One
of the problems with deciding on an appropriate risk regulator is that systemic risk can emerge from various corners of the financial system. It
can be generated by financial firms or products beyond the purview of a
central bank’s expertise or its usual jurisdiction. Further, in the eyes of
many critics, the Fed did a poor job of predicting or preventing the 2008
4
financial meltdown. Moreover, in the United Kingdom, where the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”), rather than the Bank of England,
was responsible for the regulation of financial firms, the FSA was equally inept.
This author believes that any systemic risk regulator should be an independent agency without responsibilities that would conflict with its
duties to examine and make recommendations with regard to systemic
risks. Further, important systemic risks will necessarily remain within the
purview of existing regulators unless the United States moves to a model
of regulation by many fewer agencies, a politically unlikely development. Some of these regulators currently are independent agencies, but
some are not. Also, although the Council of Regulators contemplated by
many of the pending reform proposals would be an improvement over
the President’s Working Group, a committee of agency heads is unlikely
to effectively blow the whistle on dangerous products or activities in the
financial markets. Further, one or more agencies need to have the power
to enforce any decision that a serious systemic risk exists. To suppose
that some super-regulator or the Fed will have the sole power to enforce
recommendations with regard to risky products or conduct in the financial markets, in our politically fractured and captured world is, in the author’s opinion, unrealistic.
Accordingly, the author recommends the creation of a new agency.
This new agency could be modeled on the Office of Management and
Budget (“OMB”), the Government Accounting Office (“GAO”), or the
National Transportation Safety Board, but independent of the Executive
and Congressional Branches. It could investigate and analyze systemic
risks and propose action to the President, Congress, or individual regulaand the Fed to agree on intermarket mechanisms to prevent another crash. Exec. Order
No. 12,631, 53 Fed. Reg. 9421 (Mar. 18, 1988).
3. José Manuel González-Páramo, Member of the Exec. Bd. of the Eur. Cent. Bank,
Presentation of the Report “Observatorio sobre la reforma de los mercados financieros
2009, realizado por la Fundación de Estudios Financieros,” (Jan. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100122.en.html.
4. Robert Weissman, Deregulation and the Financial Crisis¸ HUFFINGTON POST,
Apr. 12, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-weissman/deregulation-and-thefina_b_82639.html.
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tory agencies, including the Fed. This systemic risk regulator should consult with the Council of Regulators, but implementation of any recommendations should be left to the responsible agencies, to the Executive,
or to Congress. One of the problems with a more radical regulatory
reform, that may well be in order, is that blame for the financial meltdown has been a political hot potato and many officials who were responsible have not yet accepted responsibility. Given the complex structure of the European Union (“EU”), it would seem that a systemic risk
regulator for Europe would similarly have to be an advisory body within
the framework of the E.U. The E.U. Commission has proposed such a
regulator.5
Part I will define systemic risk and the various proposals for a systemic
risk regulator that have been put forth in the United States. Part II will
discuss the conflicts of interest between assessing systemic risk and acting as a prudential regulator. Part III will outline the consideration of
similar issues in Europe. Part IV will delineate a proposal for a new systemic risk regulator.
I. PROPOSALS FOR A SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATOR
A. Defining Systemic Risk
There are various types of risk in the capital markets, both to individu6
al firms and to the system as a whole. A financial product can pose
7
counterparty credit risk, operational risk, and market risk. Undue concentrations, excessive leverage, or internal control failures can cause a
financial firm to collapse. Systemic risk is risk to an entire financial system or market, as opposed to the collapse of one firm within that market.8
This risk comes about because firms price only internal costs and benefits and not risks to the financial system.9 Therefore, individual firms find
it profitable to take on more risk and leverage than is socially optimal.10
Furthermore, the financial meltdown of 2008 demonstrated that financial
contagion spread from the United States to other countries because there
5. Commission Communication for the Spring European Council, Driving European
Recovery, COM (2009) 114 final (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/archives/
commission_2004-2009/president/pdf/press_20090304_en.pdf.
6. Christine M. Cumming & Beverly J. Hirtle, The Challenges of Risk Management
in Diversified Financial Companies, 3 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 89, 89 (2001).
7. Kathleen A. Scott, Addressing the Conditions Leading to System Risk on a Global
Basis, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 2009, at 2.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Matthew Beville, Comment, Financial Pollution: Systemic Risk and Market Stability, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 245, 245 (2009).
10. Id. at 246.
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was no international architecture to prevent global crises from erupting.11
National financial systems, like individual financial firms may thus become over-leveraged and take risks that will then infect the global markets.
The current financial crisis was sparked by unregulated or poorly regulated securitization of mortgages and credit default swaps.12 Additional
related causes, such as failures by credit rating agencies (“CRA”s) to
appropriately price rated securities, also were important. Systemic risk
can also arise from poorly regulated financial institutions or speculative
market conduct. Some of the tools currently in place to guard against the
collapse of individual firms, such as capital adequacy rules by banking
and securities regulators, did not ward off the collapse of individual firms
that were important to the financial system. In fact, over-the-counter
(“OTC”) derivatives markets were not regulated at all. This paper will
address the issue of whether the current proposals for a systemic risk
regulator are likely to prevent systemic shocks to the financial markets in
the future.
B. The Administration’s Proposals and Counter-proposals
In March 2009, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury outlined a framework for regulatory reform, initially focusing on containing systemic
risk.13 This framework was important for what it covered, and also for
the issues that it did not address. There were five components of the
Treasury’s framework: 1) a single independent systemic regulator with
responsibility for systemically important firms, critical payment and settlement systems; 2) higher capital and risk management standards for
systemically important firms; 3) registration of all hedge fund advisers of
a certain size with the SEC; 4) a comprehensive framework of oversight,
protections and disclosure for the OTC derivatives market; and 5) new
requirements for money market funds to reduce the risk of rapid withdrawals.14
An alternative proposal for a Council of Regulators was put forth by
some Republicans and advocated by the Chairman of the Federal Deposit
11. DICK K. NANTO, U.S. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS:
ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 23 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RL34742.pdf.
12. See generally Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure,
41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1327 (2009).
13. See Press Release, Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Outlines Framework for Regulatory Reform (Mar. 26, 2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg72.html.
14. Id.
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Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). This Council would address issues that
pose risks to the financial system as a whole and would include a Chairman of the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Fed,
the Chairman of the FDIC, the Chairman of the National Credit Union
Administration, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”).15 The Chairman of the Council of Regulators
would serve as the principal advisor to the President on matters related to
overseeing, monitoring, and preventing systemic risk and would make
recommendations to the Council on systemic risk regulatory policy.16
This proposal would centralize the responsibility for supervising systemically important financial institutions and would identify and mitigate the
build-up of risk by individual firms. The Council would identify systemically important institutions, practices and markets, implement actions to
address those risks, ensure information flow, analyze and make recommendations on potential systemic risks, set capital adequacy standards,
and ensure that key regulators apply those standards. The Council would
have the authority to overrule or force actions on behalf of other regulators.17
Other Republican proposals would limit the Fed’s authority to overseeing monetary policy and transfer the Fed’s authority for prudential regulation of bank holding companies to a new financial institutions regulator. In addition, the Republicans proposed a Market Stability and Capital
Adequacy Board to identify systemic risks in the entire financial system.
This, in addition to the Council members described above, would include
five private, presidentially-appointed members with no more than three
18
members from the same political party. Further, one of the eleven
members would be reserved for someone who had served as a state insurance commissioner or supervisor.19
In June 2009, the Obama Administration issued a White Paper on Financial Regulatory Reform,20 followed by legislative texts to implement
15. Financial System Stabilization and Reform Act of 2009, S. 664, H.R. 1754, 111th
Cong. (2009).
16. Id. at § 112(a)(1)(A).
17. Regulation and Resolving Institutions Considered “Too Big To Fail”: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (May 6,
2009) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, FDIC)
18. Press Release, Committee on Financial Services, Republicans Announce Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Plan (June 11, 2009), available at
http://republicans.financialservices.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie
w&id=600.
19. Id.
20. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM A NEW FOUNDATION:
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the White Paper.21 The Administration’s proposals would require the Fed
to designate all large, highly leveraged and substantially interconnected
22
financial companies as Tier 1 financial holding companies (“FHCs”).
This designation would not be limited to bank holding companies, and it
could extend to foreign financial institutions with sufficient operations in
23
the United States. The Fed would then regulate FHCs. Such regulation
would encompass capital adequacy standards, the ordering of corrective
action, liquidity standards and overall risk management requirements.
Nevertheless, a working group headed by the Treasury would conduct a
reassessment of regulatory capital requirements for Tier 1 FHCs and oth24
ers. This reassessment would necessarily be in the context of the Basel
Committee standards for bank capital adequacy. Although the Fed would
essentially become the primary federal systemic risk regulator, a great
deal of systemic risk regulation would in fact fall to others because the
White Paper would leave most of the existing federal financial regulators
in place.25
A new Financial Services Oversight Council (“Council”)26 would have
the Secretary of the Treasury as its Chairman and would have as its
27
members the chairs of the federal financial regulatory agencies. The
Council would act essentially as an advisory group responsible for identifying gaps in regulation and detecting emerging risks. It would, however,
28
have no power to take direct action or to compel the Fed to do so. The
Council would replace the President’s Working Group.

REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf.
21. See FinancialStability.gov, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Proposed Text of Bank
Holding Company Modernization Act of 2009, available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/07222009/titleII.pdf .
22. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. The Office of Thrift Supervision and the Comptroller of the Currency would be
folded into a new government agency, the National Bank Supervisor. An Office of National Insurance would be created, but it would have no real power other than to enter
into international agreements and facilitate greater cooperation on insurance regulation by
the states. A Consumer Financial Protection Agency would be created to protect consumers of financial services, and this agency would take away some powers from the Fed and
other agencies, but this controversial proposal has little to do with systemic risk regulation.
26. See FinancialStability.gov, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Proposed Text of Financial Services Oversight Council Act of 2009, available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/07222009/titleI.pdf.
27. Financial Stability Improvement Act of 2009, H.R. 3996, 111th Cong. (2009).
28. Id.
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Various tasks related to systemic risk would remain with the SEC, the
CFTC, or others. Advisers to private pools of capital, including hedge
funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds would be required
to register with the SEC if their assets under management exceed some
specified threshold. Although the funds would not be required to register,
and the connection between hedge funds in particular and systemic risk
is more a matter of suspicion than proof, information regarding assets
under management, leverage, off-balance sheet exposures and other matters related to systemic risk would have to be reported to the SEC. The
SEC would then share such reports with the Fed.29 The White Paper also
assigns to the SEC the task of continuing with plans to strengthen the
regulatory framework for money market mutual funds and the regulation
of CRAs, including, wherever possible, the reduction of the use of rat30
ings in regulations.
Neither the White Paper, nor the proposed legislation implementing it,
would merge the SEC and the CFTC or clarify their respective areas of
jurisdiction with regard to financial futures products. Rather, the SEC
and the CFTC would be required to harmonize futures and securities
regulation, and if unable to do so, the Secretary of the Treasury would
decide any jurisdictional disputes.31 Also, the SEC and the CFTC would
be given unlimited authority to police market abuses involving over-thecounter (“OTC”) derivatives.32
The White Paper requested the SEC and the CFTC to identify conflicts
in statutes and regulations with respect to similar types of financial instruments and explain why such differences are essential to achieve underlying policy objectives or to make recommendations for change.33
After hearings, these agencies issued such a report on October 16,
2009.34 Among the topics that specifically relate to systemic risk discussed in the report were oversight of new products, segregation, insolvency, margin regulations, and clearing systems.
29. On April 29, 2009, the E.U. proposed legislation that would require European
hedge fund managers with 100 million Euros or more under management to report regularly to their competent national authorities on their main investments, performance and
risks, and funds would be subject to rules on minimum capital, risk management and
auditing.
30. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20.
31. Id.
32. See Bill Would Split Oversight Between SEC, CFTC; Goal to ‘Preserve’ Markets,
41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1397 (July 27, 2009).
33. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, supra note 20, at 50–51.
34. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N & U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
A JOINT REPORT OF THE SEC AND THE CFTC ON HARMONIZATION OF REGULATION (2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/cftcjointreport101609.pdf.
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In order to contain systemic risk, the White Paper would require all
standardized OTC derivatives to be cleared through central counterparties that impose margin requirements and more stringent capital require35
ments on OTC derivatives dealers. Also, standardized derivatives contracts would be required to be transacted on regulated exchanges or electronic trading platforms.36 These recommendations are strongly endorsed
by the Fed.37
An important component of the Administration’s proposal is the creation of a new financial products consumer protection agency. The White
Paper proposed that the Council head this agency. The pros and cons of
creating such an agency will not be discussed in this article. Although it
can be argued that “the lack of meaningful federal oversight of consumer
credit exacerbated the off-loading of risk to investors,” sending a shock
wave across the financial markets.38 In the author’s view, the creation of
a financial consumer protection agency is unlikely to mitigate systemic
risk. On the other hand, the Fed’s lax attitude toward consumer credit
was symptomatic of its deregulatory philosophy.
Another important component of financial regulatory reform is resolution authority for large, interconnected financial firms, outside of the
bankruptcy courts.39 Since the Administration’s proposals were floated, a
draft law from the Treasury and the House Financial Services Committee
would give the Fed sweeping powers over systemically significant firms
short of winding up.40 For example, the Fed could order a firm to sell a
risky division or stop dangerous trading activity, since the draft bill allows the Fed to require any systemically significant company to “sell or
35. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20.
36. See Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan, Hedge Funds May Lose as Derivatives Proposal
Advances, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 12, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=a4bIfOU56Oxo.
37. Over-the-Counter Derivative: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th
Cong. (2009) (testimony of Patricia White, Assoc. Director, Division of Research and
Statistics).
38. See INVESTORS’ WORKING GROUP, CFA INST. CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY AND
COUNCIL OF INST. INVESTORS, U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: THE INVESTORS’
PERSPECTIVE 18 (2009), available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource%
20center/investment%20issues/Investors'%20Working%20Group%20Report%20(July%2
02009).pdf.
39. See FinancialStability.gov, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Proposed Resolution Authority for Large, Interconnected Companies Act of 2009, available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/title-XII_resolutionauthority_072309.pdf.
40. See Tom Braithwaite et al., Draft Law Gives Fed Sweeping Powers, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 2009, at 1.
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otherwise transfer assets or off-balance sheet items to unaffiliated firms,
to terminate one or more activities or to impose conditions on the manner
in which the identified financial holding company conducts . . . activities.”41
The White Paper’s proposals were controversial, and arguments broke
out not only between the Administration and members of Congress, but
also among various federal regulators over the merits of taking powers
away from the Fed, giving more powers to the Fed, creating a Council of
Regulators, with or without enforcement powers, and many other matters. Political realities militate against merging the SEC and the CFTC or
creating a federal insurance regulator. Considered together with those
realities, the White Paper’s compromise proposal for moving some authority to or from particular agencies met resistance by the agencies, their
Congressional oversight committee members, as well as industry lob42
byists.
43
Subsequently, the House passed regulatory reform legislation, and
44
Senator Dodd proposed a companion Senate bill. The House bill
tracked the White Paper’s proposals in most important respects. It would
create a Council of regulators to oversee systemic risk and prepare strat45
egies for threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system. Primary
financial regulatory agencies would be empowered to enforce prudential
standards. The Fed would have the power to treat systemically important
non-bank financial holding companies as if they were bank holding com46
panies. OTC derivatives would be forced into clearinghouses and on to
exchanges. An independent financial products consumer protection
agency would be created. A new resolution authority would be created
for bank holding companies or any systemically important financial
company whereby the FDIC would act as receiver according to bank resolution rules rather than bankruptcy rules.
The Senate bill also would assign systemic risk assessment functions
to a Council, chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, but it would in
addition create an Office of Financial Research within the Department of
the Treasury to act as an advisor to the Council. This Office would col47
lect and analyze financial data. Two important differences between the

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. (2009).
44. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2009).
45. H.R. 4173.
46. Id.
47. S. 3217.
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House and Senate bills relating to systemic risk concern resolution authority and the financial consumer protection agency. The Senate bill
would set up an Orderly Liquidation Authority Panel composed of three
judges from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware that
could appoint the FDIC as a receiver. The Senate bill also would place
the financial consumer protection agency inside the Fed as an independent agency.
In view of the partisanship on display in Washington, it is difficult to
predict whether there will be any meaningful regulatory reform during
this session of Congress. Further, both the House and Senate bills would
result in only incremental changes in the structure and powers of financial regulators. Nevertheless, it can be expected that existing regulators
will exercise their powers to increase capital adequacy requirements,
mandate risk management systems and otherwise guard against systemic
risk more forcefully.
C. Conflicts between Systemic and Prudential Regulation
There are several reasons why proposals that give the Fed the responsibility for being the systemic risk regulator have generated opposition.
Many observers feel the Fed was a systemic risk regulator and it failed to
prevent the speculative boom in structured finance products that led to
the financial meltdown. They charge that the Fed’s easy money policy
enabled financial firms to amass large concentrations of risky and complex securitized products.48 Alan Greenspan, as Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, embraced derivatives since he believed they were good
for banks because they spread risk.49 He argued that derivatives were
essential to the stability of the banking system and therefore should not
be regulated.50 Further, he “attributed the substantial increase in U.S.
wealth and productivity in part to the derivatives markets.”51 However,
by keeping interest rates too low, the Fed fueled a stock market bubble
and then a credit bubble.52

48. Braithwaite et. al., supra note 40, at 25.
49. David Blake, Greenspan’s sins return to haunt us, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at
17.
50. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1023–24 (2007).
51. Kai Kramer, Comment, Aren’t We Still in the “Garden of the Forking Paths”? A
Comment on Consolidation of the SEC and CFTC, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 410, 417
(2004).
52. See Greg Ip, In Treating U.S. After Bubble, Fed Helped Create New Threats,
WALL ST. J., June 9, 2005, at A1.
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Other critics believe that the Fed has too much power now and should
not get more power without greater congressional oversight.53 More than
250 Republicans co-sponsored a bill that would allow the GAO to conduct audits of Fed decisions on monetary policy.54 Members of this
group argued that the Fed’s role should be limited to overseeing monetary policy and the payments system, and regulatory responsibilities and
systemic oversight detract from focus on fighting inflation.55
Others have focused on the conflicts of interest inherent in having a
prudential regulator of financial holding companies also act as a systemic
regulator. As the prudential regulator of bank holding companies and
Tier 1 FHCs, would the Fed have the backbone to put an end to the sale
of financial products or to financial businesses that are lucrative for the
banks? Alan Greenspan not only did not do so, but encouraged the expansion of derivatives trading because it seemed to enhance the balance
56
sheets of banks. It has been argued that the capital rules of the Basel II
accords, endorsed by the world’s leading central banks increased market
instability during the financial crisis.57 While a different Fed Chairman,
less enamored of deregulation than Alan Greenspan, might take a different approach to financial products that increase the earnings of banks, the
conflict between systemic regulation, prudential regulation and monetary
policy are difficult to reconcile. These conflicts have become worse since
the bailout because Wall Street banks are buying massive amounts of
securities to help stabilize the markets.58 Some advocates of giving the
Fed enhanced powers and responsibilities as a systemic regulator have
therefore argued that prudential regulation of banks should be transferred
to a consolidated federal bank regulator.59 One additional reason given
for not making the Fed the systemic regulator is that the Fed favors
53. Edmund L. Andrews, Two Authorities on Fed Advise Congress Against Expanding Its Power, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at B3.
54. Id.
55. Jon Hilsenrath, Revamp Could Hurt Central Bank, Warns Head of Philadelphia
Fed, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2009, at A6; John Taylor, Fed Needs Better Performance, Not
Powers, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, at 7.
56. Blake, supra note 49.
57. Beville, supra note 9, at 249. All of the largest investment banks including Bear
Stearns, Goldman Sachs, and J.P. Morgan were using Basel II net capital calculations.
58. Brooke Masters & Henny Sender, Wall St Profits from Fed Role, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 2009, at 1.
59. Reducing Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Serv., 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Alice M. Rivlin, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution); Alan Blinder, Early Warnings System, Run by the Fed, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2009, at BU5; Robert C. Pozen, Systemic Risk and the Fed, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2009, at
A13; Mark Warner, America Needs A Single Bank Regulator, FIN. TIMES., Aug. 6, 2009,
at 11.
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secrecy over public disclosure and would not be sufficiently transparent.60
The Administration’s proposals set off a turf war. Some agencies, together with their congressional oversight committees, are afraid of losing
power; thus, various arguments have been raised in favor of the status
quo.61 These arguments are generally in the form of advocating that a
Council of Regulators should become the systemic risk regulator.62 Yet,
the President’s Working Group has been in existence since 1987 and it
has been largely ineffectual in identifying products or practices that pose
63
risks to the financial system. A committee of regulators frequently engaged in turf warfare is unlikely to solve system wide risks to the financial markets.
The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”)
has recommended that all important financial institutions and systems
should be subject to a systemic risk regulator, regardless of their charter
or primary functional regulator.64 The systemic risk regulator should
have access to information about any institution that might be systemically important, as it determines. Further, market sectors where individual firms are not systemically important, but where such firms in the aggregate may have a significant impact on systemic risk, should be in65
cluded within the purview of a systemic risk regulator. According to
SIFMA, systemically important institutions are those likely to have “serious adverse effects on economic conditions or the financial stability of
other entities if they were allowed to fail.”66 Although SIFMA endorsed
60. INVESTORS’ WORKING GROUP, supra note 38, at 25.
61. Stephen Labaton, Regulators Spar for Turf in Financial Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 2009, at B1; Sarah O’Connor, Geithner Urges End to ‘Dumb Regulation’, FIN.
TIMES, July 25, 2009, at 7; see also Kara Scannell, Big Companies Go to Washington to
Fight Regulations on Fancy Derivatives, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2009, at B1.
62. Regulation and Resolving Institutions Considered “Too Big to Fail”: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009)
(statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, FDIC); Mary Shapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Address to the Investment Company Institute: Building a Stable and Efficient
Financial
System
(May
8,
2009),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch050809mls.htm.
63. See generally John P. Hunt, Hedge Fund Regulation: The President’s Working
Group Committees’ Best Practices Reports—Raising the Bar but Missing Risks 9 (June
2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HedgeFundRegulationJune0821(1).pdf.
64. See Industry Perspectives on the Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory
Reform Proposals, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 96 (July 17,
2009) (statement of Randolph C. Snook, Executive Vice President of SIFMA).
65. Id. at 97.
66. Id.
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a single oversight body as a systemic risk regulator, it was neutral as to
whether the Fed should be that body.67
Most commentators share the opinion that the Fed should remain independent and any systemic risk regulator should be independent.68 The
meaning of independence in this context is generally left undefined,
however. Does it mean independent from the Executive and/or Congressional branches of government, or does it mean independent from regulated entities? Such entities generally exert their influence through the
congressional oversight committees for the financial regulators, and given the corrupting influence of campaign contributions on U.S. politics,
such influence is difficult to resist. Although a stable source of funding is
sometimes considered a way for a financial regulator to remain independent, some argue that such funding necessarily leads to the agency’s loss
of independence if it comes from regulated entities. As an example, the
Fed has been criticized for the heavy influence that banks have on its
governance.69
II. THE EUROPEAN DEBATE
The E.U. Commission issued a Communication in May 2009 recommending that the European Council:
1) endorse the creation of a new European Systemic Risk Council
(“ESRC”) chaired by the President of the ECB and composed of governors of national central banks, the chairpersons of the three European
Supervisory Authorities and a member of the Commission . . . [and]
....
2) agree on the establishment of a new European System of Financial
Supervisors (“ESFS”) composed of three new European Supervisory
Authorities to develop common supervisory approaches
and a single set
70
of harmonized rules for all financial firms . . . .
67. Id. at 93.
68. See The Value of Bank Independence; Critics Should Realize Central Bank Did
Wrong Job Well, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 3, 2009, at 6; see also David Wessel, Experts Tell Congress to Lay Off the Fed, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2009, at A3; Letter from
Karl J. Ege, Chair, ABA, Section of Business Law, to The Honorable Barney Frank (Apr.
29,
2009),
available
at
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CL116000/newsletterpubs/Systemic
RiskLetter.pdf.
69. INVESTORS’ WORKING GROUP, supra note 38, at 2.
70. Commission of the European Communities, European Financial Supervision, at
15, COM (2009) 252 final (May 27, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ intenl_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/communication_may2009/C2009_715_en.pdf.
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The role of the ESRC would be to collect and analyze information in order to monitor and assess potential threats arising from macro-economic
developments and developments within the financial system as a
71
whole. The ESRC would identify and prioritize systemic risks and then
issue warnings, to make recommendations and to monitor the agencies
72
responsible for taking remedial action. The ESRC would not have legally binding powers, and would be accountable to the Council and European Parliament.73 In the view of the Commission, Finance Ministers
should not be members of this systemic risk regulator because such
membership would blur the ESRC’s role in providing independent technical analysis of macro-prudential risks.74
The E.U. currently has three Committees of Supervisors for different
financial industry segments, which act as advisory committees to coordinate E.U. regulation. These are the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (“CEBS”), Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee (“CEIOPS”) and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (“CESR”). These committees were created pursuant
to the Lamfalussy process designed to streamline and integrate financial
regulation.75 The May Communication asserted that these committees
had reached the limits of what they could accomplish and so they should
be replaced by three new European Supervisory Authorities, one for
banking, one for insurance and occupational pensions, and a securities
authority. These new Supervisory Authorities would then be authorized
to develop binding technical standards and to draw up interpretive guidelines in order to ensure a single set of harmonized rules. It would also
ensure consistent application of E.U. rules to achieve a common supervisory culture with consistent practices. The Authorities would regulate
CRAs and counterparty clearing houses, coordinate responses in crisis
situations, collect micro-prudential information, and undertake an international role.76 These three Supervisory Authorities would then be combined to form the ESFS.77 The Supervisory Authorities should be designed to be independent and transparent.78

71. Id. at 3.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 5.
74. Id. at 6.
75. Id. at 8 n.5. See generally Niamh Moloney, The Committee of European Regulators and level 3 of the Lamfalussy Process, in PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY LAW AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION 449 (Michel Tison, et al. eds., 2009).
76. Commission of the European Communities, supra note 70, at 9–11.
77. Id. at 13.
78. Id.
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The May Communication paid some attention to the legal authority required to form the ESRC and the ESFS.79 There has long been a debate
over the question of whether E.U.’s wide regulators for financial services
could be created without an amendment to the E.U. treaties providing for
them.80
The Communication was based on a Report by a Group chaired by
Jacques de Larosiere,81 followed by a Communication by the Commission and a comment period.82 The de Larosiere Group Report argued that
while it supports an enlarged role for the ECB in macro-prudential oversight, it did not support any role for the ECB in micro-prudential oversight. Some of its reasons were rooted in the special problems of E.U.
law and politics, while others resonated with the debates in the United
States. The Group argued that adding micro-supervisory duties to the
ECB’s brief could impinge on its fundamental mandate of monetary sta83
bility. Also, the ECB is not entitled to deal with insurance companies.84
The United Kingdom has frequently parted company with other E.U.
countries with regard to financial regulation, so it is interesting that the
U.K. has been supportive of the Commission’s Communication, and in
particular endorsed the idea of establishing the ESFS and the ESRB.85
Within the U.K., the Treasury has argued for maintaining the existing
regulatory structure where the Financial Services Authority is a unified
regulator for all financial services, and the Bank of England is responsible for financial stability.86
Both the U.S. and the E.U. need to consider how to incorporate into
domestic law the recommendations and decisions of the Financial Stability Board, which was created and enlarged by the G-20 to supersede the
Financial Stability Forum. The mandate of the Financial Stability Board
is “to address vulnerabilities and to develop and implement strong regulatory, supervisory and other policies in the interest of financial stabili-

79. Id. at 8, 14.
80. See Gilles Thieffry, The Case For a European Securities Commission,, in
REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 222–23 (Eilís
Ferran & Charles A.E. Goodhart eds., 2001).
81. JACQUES DE LAROSIÈRE ET AL., THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL.
SUPERVISION IN THE EU (2009), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/reforming
_financial_markets080709.pdf.
82. Driving European Recovery, supra note 5, at 4–5.
83. DE LAROSIÈRE ET AL., supra note 81, at 43–44.
84. Id.
85. HM TREASURY, REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS, 2009, Cm. 7667.
86. Id. at 11. Opposition parties, however, have other proposals. See Britain: More to
Do; Financial Reform, ECONOMIST, July 25, 2009, at 55.
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ty.”87 It has focused on critical reforms underway in a number of areas,
including reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important
financial firms and expanding oversight of the financial system.88
III. THE CREATION OF A NEW SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATOR
The specifications for a systemic risk regulator in the United States
would not be so difficult or so controversial if the regulatory system for
financial institutions was not already so balkanized. Almost every study
of the U.S. financial regulatory system has recommended consolidation
of the plethora of agencies regulating financial institutions and prod89
ucts. Although there have been different proposals for two peaks, three
peaks or more peaks regulation, none of the studies recommend that the
present system should remain in place. The Administration’s proposals in
this regard are exceedingly timid. Only the Office of Thrift Supervision
would be abolished; the SEC and the CFTC would remain separate agencies; and insurance supervision would remain with fifty state regula90
tors. The Senate bill would further consolidate the banking agencies,
however. The idea that the Fed should take on the responsibility of designating Tier 1 financial holding companies, act as their systemic regulator, and also continue to supervise bank holding companies as a prudential regulator is a substitute for more far reaching reform of financial
regulation. Further, it is a poor substitute because it involves too many
conflicts of interest and it is unlikely to be effective when some of the
Tier 1 FHCs are regulated by the states and others by a variety of federal
agencies. If the Fed were to shed its prudential regulatory powers, and a
consolidated banking agency were to be created, I would be in the camp
of believing the Fed could function as a systemic regulator. But if such a
consolidation is not to occur, I believe a new systemic risk regulator
should be created. Furthermore, if the United States makes the Fed its
systemic regulator, it will be out of step with the ongoing reforms in the
E.U., and international coordination may be more difficult as a result.
Unfortunately, the creation of a new systemic risk regulator would
merely add to the excessive mix of federal regulators. But if appropriately structured, it could at least be objective and independent. The Inves87. Financial Stability Board, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org.
88. Id.
89. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK
FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S.
REGULATORY SYSTEM (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09216.pdf
90. Gail C. Bernstein, Matthew A. Chambers, Sara A. Kelsey & Martin E. Lybecker,
Are We Halfway There Yet? House Passes Major Financial Services Bill With Senate
Expected to Act Early This Year, 127 BANKING L.J. 12, 12 (2010).
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tors’ Working Group has proposed an independent systemic risk regulator that would supplement existing financial regulators, and would consist of a chair and four other members, all of whom would be Presidential
appointees.91 Its mission would include collecting and analyzing the exposures of financial institutions, whether banks or non-banks, as well as
products and practices that could threaten the stability of the U.S. financial system and economy. It would undertake reporting on those systemic
risks and recommending steps by regulators to reduce those risks.92 This
oversight would require aggregating and analyzing risk exposures across
firms, securities instruments, and markets.93 The Investors’ Group would
not give the systemic risk regulator the power to compel financial regulatory agencies to adopt regulations or otherwise halt systemic risks. But it
would make regulators comply with its regulations or provide policy justifications for not doing so.94
The Office of Financial Research, proposed in the Senate bill, would
be a step in the direction of creating a systemic risk monitor. This Office
would collect data on behalf of the Council, standardize the types and
formats of data reported and collected, perform research, and develop
95
risk measurement tools. It would, however, be a part of the Department
of the Treasury, an Executive Branch Agency, and therefore it would not
be an independent agency. Conceivably, it could develop a tradition of
independence, similar to the culture of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
The author generally agrees with the concept proposed by the Investors’ Working Group with an important exception. Their proposal contemplates that the systemic risk regulator would be accountable primarily
to Congress.96 In my experience, Congress is at least as political as the
Executive branch,97 and the systemic regulator needs to be independent
and highly professional. How an agency can be independent of both
Congress and the Executive and still be constitutional is a somewhat
daunting challenge, but such independence in fact, if not in law, should
be the objective. One way to achieve such independence is to provide the
91. INVESTORS’ WORKING GROUP, supra note 38, at 26.
92. Id. at 24.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 25.
95. Matt Cover, Obama-Backed Financial Reform Bill Would Create New Bureaucracy with Power to Subpoena ‘Any Data’ from ‘Any Financial Company,’ CNS NEWS,
April 6, 2010, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/63756.
96. Id. at 26.
97. Congressional interference in financial regulation is generally based on lobbying
by regulated entities and can be highly destructive of agency independence. A recent
example is the outcry about mark-to-market accounting.
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systemic regulator with stable funding sufficient to attract a professional
staff of experts. But another factor is for the Executive and Congress to
exercise restraint in interfering with the systemic regulator’s work. It is
conceivable that the inability of such a regulator to enforce its recommendations may make such restraint possible.
The GAO is a possible organizational model for a systemic risk regulator. The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that investigates
how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars. Among other
things, at the request of a congressional committee or subcommittee, it
audits agency operations, reports on how well government programs and
policies are meeting their objectives. The GAO also performs policy analyses and outlines options for congressional consideration.98 The head of
the GAO, the Comptroller General of the United States, is appointed to a
15-year term by the President from a slate of candidates, and is subject to
Senate confirmation.99 This slate is composed of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the
majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate, the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.100 Although
this selection process is cumbersome, it is designed to ensure that the
Comptroller is independent and nonpartisan. A similar selection process
for the Chairman of a systemic risk regulator could be appropriate.
Some lessons could also be taken from the operation of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) within OMB. Since OMB
is a cabinet within the Executive Branch, the head of OMB is not inde101
pendent.
However, the OIRA within OMB monitors agencies to implement government-wide policies and standards with respect to federal
regulations and guidance documents. The OIRA also monitors the quality, utility, and analytic rigor of information used to support public policy,
particularly with respect to cost/benefit analyses.102 To some extent,
OIRA is an Executive Branch analogue of OMB with regard to its interaction with Federal agencies.
Another possible model for a systemic risk agency is the National
Transportation and Safety Board (“NTSB”), an independent federal
98. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, About GAO, http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html.
99. Id.
100. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, How the Comptroller General is Selected,
http://www.gao.gov/about/cgprocess.html
101. The White House Office of Management and Budget, Information and Regulatory
Affairs, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/regulatory_affairs/default.
102. Id.
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agency that investigates every civil aviation accident in the United States
103
It has a board
and accidents in other transportation modes as well.
composed of five members appointed by the President, with a term of
five years. No more than three of the five members can be of the President’s party, and the President designates the Chairman and Vice Chair104
man for a term of two years.
Initially, the NTSB was dependent on
the Department of Transportation for its funding and administrative sup105
port, but in 1975 all ties to that department were severed.
Although
the NTSB has no regulatory authority, its “fiercely independent” identity
allows it to maintain its credibility in investigating accidents, providing
“careful and conclusive forensic analysis,” and making recommendations
106
to avoid future accidents.
Although neither GAO, OMB, nor the
NTSB have the power to compel agencies to act or refrain from acting,
they nevertheless are powerful actors within the Federal government and
influence rulemaking and other policies. My vision of an appropriate systemic regulator is a similar type of agency—responsive both to Congress
and the Executive—that could investigate and analyze financial data to
determine whether systemic risks are emerging. This systemic regulator
should have the power to advise financial regulators of dangers, and suggest mitigating actions, perhaps by forwarding its reports to the Council
of Regulators. However, it would be the duty of the financial regulators,
Congress and the Executive Branch to deal with implementing action. In
the final analysis, the problem of dealing with systemic risk is a political
problem. A systemic risk regulator cannot, and should not, bear all of the
responsibility for preventing financial market meltdowns. But a good
regulator could uncover dangers to the financial system and assign responsibility for preventing collapses to those charged with regulating
financial institutions and markets. Although the Office of Financial Research that would be established by the Senate bill is a step in the direction, its independence and mission would have to be better articulated for
it to function effectively.
CONCLUSION
The causes of the financial meltdown and ongoing recession are complex. At their root the causes are economic, such as government budget
deficits and trade imbalances. But poor regulation made this crisis much
103. Andrew W. Lo, The Financial Industry Needs Its Own Crash Safety Board, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, at 20.
104. 49 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2006).
105 See Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., NTSB History and Mission, http://www.ntsb.gov/
Abt_NTSB/history.htm.
106. Lo, supra note 103.
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107

Fixing the U.S. and E.U. regulatory systems is exceedingly
worse.
difficult. But because there are genuine differences of opinion about
what solutions are optimal, even if all of the experts were to agree on the
needed reforms, politics stand in the way of a genuine reform. As critics
of the de Larosiere Report remarked: “If even a group of experts cannot
muster the courage to lay out imaginative blueprints, one can hardly expect politicians who have failed thus far to rise to the occasion and face
head-on Europe’s current challenges, to go beyond the timidity of the
Report they commissioned.”108 Similar criticism can be leveled against
the Obama Administration’s proposals. Bowing to perceived political
realities, the Treasury’s program does very little to address the balkanized regulatory system, where financial firms can choose their regulators and compromise the agencies charged with their supervision. Meanwhile, the regulators do not have the funds, the staff, or the technology to
keep pace with what is happening in the markets, and they are hobbled
109
rather than emboldened by their Congressional oversight committees.
If some firms are too big or too interconnected to fail, they should be
dismantled.110 This does not necessarily mean going back to the wall between investment and commercial banking, but it may require such
measures. When the SEC was initially formed it was tasked with breaking up the public utility holding companies that contributed to the spe111
culative stock market of the 1920s.
The U.S. taxpayer should never
again be asked to bailout Wall Street, but the proposed reforms do not
prevent such a reoccurrence. The purpose of credit and securities markets
is to finance business, not to generate trading profits. But all of the regulatory agencies over the past quarter of a century have inevitably encouraged trading and speculation over capital formation and have emphasized
112
efficiency over fairness.
107. See George Soros, Do Not Ignore the Need for Financial Reform, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
26, 2009, at 13.
108. Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, Jean-Victor Louis & René Smits, De Larosière Report
Fails
to
Tackle
Main
Issues
(Apr.
6,
2009),
available
at
http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/larosire-report-fails-tackle-mainissues/article-181014.
109. Edward Wyatt, As Lawmakers Grapple with Financial Overhaul, They Call for
More Studies, NY TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at B3; Liz Moyer, How Regulators Missed Madoff: Limited Resources, Fragmented Oversight and a Lack of Coordination Between
Agencies Allowed the Alleged $50 Million Ponzi to Flourish, FORBES, Jan. 27, 2009,
available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/bernard-madoff-sec-business-wallstreet_0127_regulators.html.
110. See Soros, supra note 107, at 11.
111. See SECHistorical.org, William O. Douglas and the Growing Power of the SEC,
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/douglas/academia.php.
112. CME Group, Reform: What Does it Mean?, OPEN MARKETS, Feb. 22, 2010,
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The proposed reforms may lead to minor improvements in financial
regulation, but they are unlikely to prevent another speculative securities
market and its inevitable collapse. They are also unlikely to restore the
confidence of investors in the fairness or safety of the markets. At one
time, stock market panics affected only a few. But today, most Americans and many Europeans invest their retirement savings in the stock
113
Market collapses therefore lead to widespread pain. The pubmarket.
lic deserves better reform than the politicians are offering.

http://openmarkets.cmegroup.com/features/reform-what-does-it-mean/.
113. MAURICIO SOTO, URBAN INSTITUTE, HOW IS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AFFECTING
RETIREMENT SAVINGS? (Mar. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/901283_retirement_savings_update.pdf.

